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Universality and its Limits:
When Research Ethics Can
Reflect Local Circumstances
David Orentlicher
S tudies in several developing countries for treatmentto prevent HIV-transmission from mother to childgenerated considerable controversy in 1997. Critics
of the studies argued that basic principles of research ethics
were violated. According to the critics, researchers subjected
women in developing countries to studies that would have
been unethical in the United States (and other developed
countries) and that the researchers were therefore engaged in
unethical exploitation of citizens of the developing countries
in which the studies were conducted.
While the critics agreed that unethical exploitation had
occurred, they differed on the exact nature of the exploita-
tion. Some observers condemned the researchers for
employing a double standard - because the researchers were
applying a standard of care that would have been unaccept-
able in their own country. In the view of these critics,
researchers should have been comparing the experimental
treatment to established therapy rather than to placebo, as
would have been required in the United States or other de-
veloped countries.' Other critics objected on the ground that
once the trials demonstrated the efficacy of the experimental
therapy, the therapy would not become available in develop-
ing countries because of its high cost. In this view, a study in
developing countries need not always conform to the stan-
dard of care in developed countries, but studies on residents
of developing countries cannot be conducted solely for the
benefit of residents of developed countries.2
The trials and their fallout raise important questions.
Can researchers conduct studies in some countries that would
be unethical in other countries? In other words, are there
universal principles of research ethics that prevent research-
ers from avoiding moral constraints in one country by moving
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their studies to another country? And if trials can be con-
ducted in some countries even though unacceptable in other
countries, does the fact that a study would be unacceptable
elsewhere place special limits on researchers conducting the
study where it is acceptable?
I will argue that one can accept the idea of universal
ethical standards for research and still permit different trials
for different countries. It does not follow that, if a research
study is unethical in the United States, it is also unethical in
Kenya. Rather, one can accept the same principles of research
ethics for Kenya and the United States and still conclude that
those universal principles allow for different studies in dif-
ferent countries because of differences in local circumstances.
I will also argue that concerns about exploitation should
place constraints on researchers conducting studies with pa-
tients in developing countries, but I will conclude that these
constraints need not be as strict as those suggested by existing
guidelines or other commentators. I will use the AZT trials
in several developing countries during the mid 1990s to il-
lustrate my arguments.
THE CoymovmsiAL AZT TRiAi-s
In 1994, researchers reported the success of zidovudine
therapy (AZT) to reduce HIV-transmission from mother to
child.' In the studies, which were conducted in France and
the United States, half of the pregnant women were given
AZT for up to twenty-five weeks during pregnancy4 as well
as during labor and delivery, and their infants were given
AZT for six weeks after birth. The other half of the women
were given a placebo. The researchers reported a two-thirds
reduction in HIV-transmission for the women and children
who received AZT therapy.
Although the results were dramatic, the researchers could
not affect treatment for all pregnant women. The treatment
Volume 3 0:3, Fall 2002
began when the women initiated prenatal care, and many
pregnant women do not receive care from an obstetrician
until they are ready to deliver. In addition, the treatment's
costs have been estimated at $800 per patient, an amount
unaffordable in most developing countries.'
In response to the study's limitations, other research-
ers conducted studies involving a less aggressive, less
expensive course of AZT therapy to see if it would also re-
duce the risk of HIV-transmission from mother to child.
The studies were conducted in developing countries, mostly
in Africa, and pregnant women in nearly all of those studies
were divided into two groups, one of which received the
less aggressive therapy, the other of which received pla-
cebo. 6
These studies were criticized initially because pregnant
women in the placebo group were denied any therapy, even
though a proven therapy to prevent HIV-transmission ex-
isted. According to the critics, an experimental treatment
should be compared to established therapy when there is an
established therapy. In this view, the less aggressive therapy
should have been compared to standard AZT treatment rather
than to placebo. If research subjects are instead given pla-
cebo, they are put at unnecessary risk for the disease being
studied. 7 It is well-recognized that in the United States, a
placebo control would not have been allowed. In other words,
the critics said, researchers should not conduct studies in
developing countries that would have been unethical in the
United States.'
Defenders of the research replied that the women given
placebo were not harmed by their participation in the stud-
ies. Because of their countries' poverty, the women would
not have had access to AZT treatment outside of the study.
By enrolling in the study, they had a 50 percent chance of
getting a potentially effective treatment. Moreover, it was
argued, a placebo arm to the study was necessary to find out
whether the less aggressive course of therapy was effective
and how effective it was. If, as expected (and as turned out),
the less aggressive therapy was less effective than the more
aggressive therapy, and the two forms of therapy were com-
pared only with each other, we would not know if the less
aggressive therapy was better than nothing.9
Still, even if a placebo control was permissible, other
critics objected to the studies on the ground that the studies
were validating experimental therapy that would become
available primarily in developed countries. Even though the
less aggressive course of therapy was much less expensive
than the more aggressive course, it would still be unaffordable
in most of the countries in which the AZT trials took place.
Under such circumstances, the critics said, the research sub-
jects were assuming the risks of research solely for the benefit
of people living in developed countries, a situation that clearly
constitutes exploitation.'
Different Research in Different Countries - A
Double Standard?
Who was correct, the opponents or proponents of the study?
To answer this question, I think it is helpful to imagine it is
1995, a year after researchers first reported the success of
AZT in reducing HIV-transmission from mother to child.
Imagine also that the following scenarios are about to occur.
Clinic physicians
A group of physicians from the U.S. decides to spend a year
in a clinic in rural Kenya, delivering medical care to patients
at the clinic. Medical students from the U.S. will rotate
through the clinic during the year under the supervision of
the visiting physicians. The physicians and students have a
number of reasons for doing this. They think it is important
to do some practice in a severely underserved community,
they think the experience will sharpen their clinical skills,
and they plan to spend some time in Kenya and neighboring
countries as tourists. At the end of the year, the physicians
will return to their U.S. practices, and the students will go
on to practice in the U.S. The physicians and students will
bring some equipment and medicines with them, but for the
most part, they will rely on the resources of the clinic. That
means that pregnant women receiving prenatal care at the
clinic will not receive AZT to prevent the spread of HIV to
their fetuses. The cost of the AZT treatment is well beyond
what is affordable for the clinic.1'
Physician entrepreneurs
A second group of physicians from the U.S. will establish a
business in rural Kenya to process natural substances from
the area into pharmaceuticals. In particular, the physicians
expect to manufacture some drugs that will be effective agents
against cancer, including cancers that are common in devel-
oping countries but very rare in developed countries. The
company will pay appropriate royalties to the Kenyan gov-
ernment if any of the drugs are marketed. The physicians
will hire workers from the local population, and they will
pay them a good local wage, but one that is below the mini-
mum wage in the U.S. The physicians will also provide health
insurance that will cover the standard of care in the local
community. That means that there will not be coverage for
pregnant women to receive AZT to prevent HIV-transmis-
sion, again because such treatment is too expensive for that
part of Kenya.
Research physicians
A third group of physicians from the U.S. comes to rural
Kenya to conduct a research trial. The physicians are inter-
ested in seeing whether a less aggressive, less expensive
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regimen of AZT treatment can also reduce HIV-infection
in newborns born to HIV-infected women. The trial will
have two arms: half the subjects will be randomized to re-
ceive the less intensive regimen of AZT to prevent
transmission of HIV; the other half of the subjects will receive
a placebo.
I take it that of the three scenarios I have described -
the doctors and medical students practicing in a local clinic,
the physicians establishing a drug company, and the doctors
conducting the AZT trial - only the research scenario would
be condemned as unethical, even though in all three ex-
amples, the U.S. physicians treat their Kenyan patients or
employees differently than they would patients or employees
in the U.S. because of differences in local circumstances.
The physicians in the local clinic give different treatment
because of differences in affordability between the U.S. and
Kenya, and the physician-entrepreneurs offer lower wages
and less generous health insurance because of differences in
the standard of living between the U.S. and Kenya. 12
Yet from the perspective of a pregnant Kenyan worried
about transmitting HIV to her child, the research scenario is
clearly superior to the other scenarios. Pregnant Kenyans are
less likely to transmit HIV to their children under the re-
search protocol than they are if they receive care in the clinic
or if they work at the drug company.
The question then is: Why would we condemn the re-
search scenario? If U.S. doctors treating patients, and U.S.
companies hiring employees can operate according to local
ethical standards, 3 why cannot U.S. medical researchers rely
on local standards in meeting their ethical obligations?
In fact, we do not need to assume different ethical stan-
dards to justify the research study. We can employ a universal
set of standards whose application may vary depending on
local resources. The idea here is similar to the principle in
medical malpractice law that a physician's obligations to
patients can take into account the facilities available. A doc-
tor practicing at a small rural hospital cannot be expected to
provide the same care as a doctor practicing at a major aca-
demic medical center.14 Thus, we would expect the U.S.
researchers to follow the same human research rules over-
seas that they follow here (e.g., informed consent, reasonable
risk-benefit ratio, minimization of risk). But if U.S. doctors
treating Kenyans are not obligated to deliver the U.S. level of
care but only care that is reasonable with Kenya's resources,
researchers also should be able to tailor their protocols to
Kenya's resources. In other words, letting researchers con-
duct studies in other countries that they could not conduct in
their own country does not necessarily entail a double stan-
dard. It is a double standard if we define the standard in
terms of which research trials can be performed. In this view,
we would have a double standard if a particular study could
be conducted in one country but not other. However, there is
no double standard if we define the standard in terms of
which ethical guidelines must be followed in designing a
study's procedures. And the important standard is the ethical
guidelines that must be employed.
Let me suggest another example that responds to the
double standard argument. This example uses the ethical
principle that research subjects can be compensated for their
participation, but compensation should not be so great that
it becomes coercive. Thus, we might allow research subjects
to be paid a few hundred dollars but not tens of thousands of
dollars. Now if we take a strict view of universal standards,
we would have to have the same limits on compensation
everywhere. If a certain payment would be unethical in Kenya,
we would have to consider it unethical in the U.S. But we do
not think that this is the consequence of universal standards.
Just because a $50 or $100 payment in Kenya might be coer-
cive, it would not be coercive in the U.S. We apply the same
standard of no coercive payments, and that leads to cut-offs
at different levels of payment around the world, because the
standard of no coercive payments has to take into account
local economic conditions.
In short, we need not condemn medical research in de-
veloping countries simply because a research protocol takes
account of the economic resources of the host country and
therefore has elements that would not be permitted in the
U.S. or other countries with more wealth.3
Other objections to the AZT trials
Objections to the AZT trials went beyond the double stan-
dard argument. I will now consider other arguments that
have been made against the AZT trials in developing coun-
tries in Africa and elsewhere.
The AZT trials in Africa were reprehensible in the
way the Tuskegee study and other notorious research
was reprehensible
These kinds of comparison are misguided. Tuskegee (the
syphilis study of poor African-American men) was bad be-
cause the subjects were deceived from the outset of the study
and because they were later deprived of a treatment that they
should have received. 6 The AZT studies did not entail de-
ception of the subjects, nor did they entail the withholding of
care that the subjects were entitled to receive outside of the
study. The pregnant women in the AZT trials were not made
worse off by virtue of their participation in the trials. 7
Note in this regard how the three-scenario comparison
that I began with helps us with the analysis. I suggested that,
if treating physicians do not have an obligation to provide
the U.S. standard of care in developing countries, research-
ers would also not have that obligation. If we look at other
studies that have been compared to the AZT trials, we see
that the researchers deviated from obligations that treating
physicians would have had. The Tuskegee case is a good
example, treating doctors would have had an obligation to
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be truthful and to provide penicillin (once penicillin became
widely available).
Peter Lurie and Sidney Wolfe mention some other ex-
amples in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine
that have the same problem as the example of the Tuskegee
study. Lurie and Wolfe claim that, if the AZT trials were
acceptable, it would also be permissible for researchers to
inject live malaria parasites in HIV-positive subjects in China
in order to study the effect on the progression of HIV-infec-
tion. is This argument is not persuasive because researchers
injecting malaria parasites would be doing something that
treating physicians could not do. Similarly, it does not fol-
low from the AZT trials that researchers could assign
malnourished aboriginals to receive either vitamin-fortified
or standard bread. 9 It is true that the aboriginals were not
made worse off by the trials, but I think we would say that, if
treating physicians offer the aboriginals bread, they should
offer vitamin-fortified rather than standard bread.
For the same reason that the Tuskegee and similar analo-
gies are mistaken, so is it mistaken to argue that the AZT
trials in developing countries were wrong because we do not
let researchers treat poor people in this country differently
than wealthy persons. We could not justify the AZT trials on
poor persons in the U.S. by saying that the poor persons
would not otherwise have received the aggressive regimen of
AZT and therefore were not made worse off by their partici-
pation in the research trials. But the reason we say that the
AZT trials would have been unethical here is because we
believe that doctors in the U.S. have an ethical (and legal)
obligation to give the same quality treatment to all persons
in their community, regardless of their wealth (once treat-
ment is commenced). We do not believe, on the other hand,
that U.S. doctors have an obligation to give poor persons
overseas the same care as wealthy (or poor) persons in the
United States. In other words, while my scenario of the U.S.
physicians practicing in a Kenyan clinic is ethically accept-
able, it would not be acceptable if the physicians practiced
in the same way in an inner city clinic in the U.S.2"
Researchers have greater obligations to their subjects
than do treating physicians to their patients
The short answer to this argument is that the researchers in
the AZT trials did more for their subjects than treating phy-
sicians in the host countries would have done for the pregnant
women as patients (as illustrated by my scenarios of the treat-
ing physicians and the research physicians). The researchers
gave the pregnant women a 50 percent instead of 0 percent
chance at a treatment that might have substantially reduced
the risk of HIV-transmission. 2' The hypothetical treating
physicians were not in a position to offer AZT treatment to
any patients.
Moreover, we hold researchers to higher standards be-
cause research often entails the taking of special risks. If we
are going to ask research subjects to assume a risk for the
benefit of society, we owe them special duties. But in this
case, the research subjects were given an opportunity to re-
duce their risk of HIV-transmission by participating in the
study. In other words, there was no heightened risk that re-
quired special consideration.
In observing that the pregnant women might have ben-
efited from their participation in the AZT trials, I am not
succumbing to the "therapeutic illusion" of medical research.
I recognize that research is designed to accumulate knowl-
edge, not to benefit research subjects. Nevertheless, in many
research trials, the subjects do have a reasonable expectation
of benefit. Pregnant women in the AZT trials genuinely could
think that they might reduce the risk of HIV-transmission to
their children by participating in the trials.
Although the requirement of special standards for re-
search was satisfied in the context of the AZT trials, it would
impose greater limits for other studies in which experimen-
tal therapies are being tested. In other words, the fact that
the pregnant women were clearly better off for their partici-
pation in the AZT trials is a feature of those studies that will
not be present in other studies. Accordingly, the analysis will
be different for other studies. I will indicate how this is so
when I further consider the exploitation argument below.
The AZT trials employed a placebo control rather
than a standard therapy control
In this view, the trials were unacceptable because experi-
mental therapies for HIV should be compared to existing
therapy, not to placebo.22 According to The Declaration of
Helsinki, new treatments "should be tested against ... the
best current" treatments, with placebos reserved for studies
in which no proven treatment exists. 2
This argument fails as well. The best therapy available
varies from country to country. For pregnant women in Kenya
at the time of the AZT trials, there was no treatment to
prevent transmission of HIV to their children. Thus, even
though we also expect treating physicians to assure patients
of the best current therapy, treating physicians need only pro-
vide those therapies that are reasonably available in their
community. The treating physicians in my scenario of the
local clinic in Kenya were obligated to provide the best
therapy available in Kenya, not the best therapy available
anywhere in the world. Similarly, physicians conducting re-
search in Kenya should be obliged only to provide the best
therapy available in Kenya.24
Moreover, as others have observed, a placebo control
was important in the AZT trials. 2 If researchers had tested
the standard therapy against the less aggressive treatment,
and the less aggressive treatment provided less protection
against HIV-transmission, we still would not know if the less
aggressive treatment was better than placebo, or whether its
advantages over placebo could justify its costs.
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Although I would not criticize the AZT trials in Africa
for including a placebo arm, I think the trials would have
been better studies if they had included a third arm - we
would have learned more about AZT treatment of HIV-in-
fected women if the less aggressive treatment had been
compared not only with placebo but also with standard
therapy. That way we would have known how the less aggres-
sive therapy compared to the more aggressive therapy as well
as how the less aggressive therapy compared to the placebo.26
Note that there is a tension between an obligation to
avoid placebo controls and an obligation to conduct research
whose results will benefit people living in the country where
the research is conducted (an obligation taken up in the next
subsection). As I and others have argued, a placebo control
was necessary to answer the question whether the less ag-
gressive course of therapy was better, or sufficiently better,
than no treatment, a critical question for people living in
countries that could not afford the more expensive course of
AZT.
The treatments being studied would not be
affordable even at their much lower cost in the host
countries and therefore should not have been studied
in those countries
This argument accepts the use of a placebo arm in develop-
ing countries - even though forbidden in developed countries
- as long as the therapy tested will be used in the host
country. The requirement that the therapy be available in the
host country after the study is over helps ensure that research-
ers do not exploit vulnerable citizens of developing countries.
Some researchers, it is thought, are like the colonialists of
old, raping poor countries for the benefit of their compatri-
ots back home. According to the research guidelines of the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS), research conducted in a country must be respon-
sive to that country's health needs.27
This is a complicated argument because it requires us to
define exploitation, and people use the term in different ways.
Some people would label a practice as exploitative only when
the practice is immoral; other people would include a wider
set of practices in their definition of exploitation and distin-
guish between acceptable and unacceptable exploitation.
Before I consider the definition of exploitation, it is
worthwhile observing that most practices that we condemn
as exploitative are practices that raise concerns about coer-
cion or the taking advantage of someone's desperate situation.
I do not think the AZT trials raised either of these concerns
(assuming proper informed consent). We worry about using
prisoners as research subjects because inmates may think
participation is required to have a good relationship with
prison authorities. We worry about letting people sell their
kidneys because indigent persons may feel that they have no
choice but to sell a kidney in order to feed or shelter their
family. That is, we worry that their desperation will lead
them to engage in action that is harmful to them. To be sure,
one might argue that the subjects in the AZT trial partici-
pated because of their poverty, but the participation did not
require them to act against their interests. We cannot con-
demn practices simply because poor people are more likely
to engage in them than wealthy people. To do that, we would
have to condemn much of capitalism.
DEFINING EXPLOITATION
Returning now to the meaning of exploitation, I distinguish
between fair and unfair exploitation rather than saying ex-
ploitation includes only unfair practices. Following Joel
Feinberg, I will define exploitation as occurring when one
person gains by using a characteristic of another person to
his/her own advantage.28 Exploitation, then, would include
my raising money for my political campaign by taking ad-
vantage of a donor's generosity, as well as my obtaining my
older brother's birthright by offering a bowl of porridge for
the birthright when my brother is famished. While both are
forms of exploitation, they differ in terms of their morality.
That takes us to the question: When is exploitation un-
fair? It is unfair if: (1) the other person does not give truly
voluntary consent; (2) the other person is harmed; (3) the
exploiter is profiting off the desperation of other persons
(e.g., selling a worthless drug to the terminally ill who are
adequately warned of the drug's uselessness); or (4) the
exploiter's gain is disproportionate when compared with the
exploited person's gain.
29
Were the AZT trials exploitative?
If we are going to condemn the AZT trials as exploitative, it
would have to be on the ground that the gain for the United
States (the exploiter) is disproportionate when compared with
the gain of Kenyans (the exploited person) (definition 4 above).
In fact, Leonard Glantz, George Annas, Michael Grodin,
and Wendy Mariner have argued that there is exploitation if
research in a developing country will not be used to benefit
residents of the developing country, 0 a principle consistent
with the CIOMS guideline requiring that, when a therapy is
developed, it must "be made reasonably available for the
benefit of [the] population or community" in the host coun-
try.31 If research results will be used only for the benefit of
people living in the developed country, we should worry that
the developed country's gain is disproportionate to the de-
veloping country's gain.
Whether this is so is a hard question. One could say that
it is too strong a definition of unfair exploitation. In other
settings, we do not consider it unfair when two people enter
a contract under which different kinds of gain are realized. It
is not unfair exploitation if workers at a Rolls Royce factory
cannot afford to purchase a Rolls Royce. Using an example
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from medicine (the second scenario at the beginning of this
article), we do not think it is unethical to develop drugs from
substances in developing countries - even if the drugs will
be used primarily in developed countries - as long as there
is fair compensation to the developing country in the form of
royalties or other payments. Nor do we think it unethical if
physicians go to Kenya and use the experience there to im-
prove their clinical skills for patients in the U.S. (the first
scenario at the beginning of this article).
Still we might say that research is different from busi-
ness or clinical practice and that researchers have higher
obligations than do employers or treating physicians. But
even so, the principle enunciated by Glantz and the CIOMS
guideline may go too far. With regard to the AZT trials, it is
not clear that there was disproportionate gain. The research
subjects got the chance to save their children from HIV-in-
fection, a very important benefit. And all participants received
access to good general medical care.
The example of the AZT trials suggests a distinction
between trials in which the research subjects will clearly be
better off by their participation and trials in which the sub-
jects may end up being harmed by their participation. For an
example of the latter kind of study, consider a trial of an
experimental drug that may have valuable therapeutic effects
but may also have serious toxicity. With this kind of study,
the possibility of exploitation is much greater than with the
AZT trials or other studies in which the advantages of par-
ticipation clearly outweigh any risks. Accordingly, it is
important to have stronger safeguards against exploitation
for studies in which research subjects assume a real risk by
virtue of their participation than for studies like the AZT
trials in which the research subjects have much to gain at
little risk to their health.
Appropriate safeguards to prevent exploitation
The question then is whether the stronger safeguards need be
as strict as suggested by Glantz and the CIOMS guideline.
Should we require that the intervention be made available after
study in the host country? Should we also require, as would
Glantz and CIOMS, that researchers establish in advance that
the intervention will definitely be used in the host country?
One can object to either part of this strict position. Rob-
ert Crouch and John Arras, have criticized the second prong
of the Glantz/CIOMS guidelines. They have argued that we
might not expect funders of research to commit in advance
to making available a treatment with hypothetical benefits
and hypothetical costs. Rather, a firm commitment may not
be achievable until the study's results begin to come in, and
the treatment's success gives more reason, and generates more
pressure, to make the therapy available in the host country.3 2
Moreover, progress sometimes occurs in multiple steps. The
experimental intervention might not make it back to the host
country, but the results of the trial could easily lead to other
trials with interventions that would make it back to the host
country. If research demonstrates that a $50 therapy is al-
most as good as an $800 therapy, one can more readily justify
a study of a $5 therapy.
While this objection to the second prong of the Glantz/
CIOMS position has force, it seems insufficient to overcome
that part of the position. If the intervention must be made
available in the host country after the study, there are good
reasons to require that the study's sponsor establish in ad-
vance that the intervention will in fact be made available.
Given the examples of exploitation by researchers in the past
and the serious harm caused to the research enterprise when
the public becomes suspicious of the motives of researchers,
we may want a strong rule to minimize the possibility of
exploitation.
The response to the first part of the strict position of
Glantz and CIOMS follows from my earlier point about
people engaged in a mutual effort realizing different kinds of
gain. Preventing exploitation does not demand that a treat-
ment be made available in the country in which it is studied.
Rather, it demands that the benefits to the host country be
proportionate to the benefits realized by the country spon-
soring the research. If the host country can benefit in ways
other than using the studied treatment - by receiving appro-
priate royalties from the sale of the drug, for example -
then no exploitation would result.
Moreover, it is possible to permit other kinds of benefit
without compromising on the requirement that a research
sponsor establish in advance that the benefit will definitely
be provided (i.e., we can preserve the second prong of the
Glantz/CIOMS position when we amend their first prong).
Indeed, it may be easier to establish in advance the provision
of appropriate royalties than to establish in advance that a
drug being studied will be made available in the host coun-
try. A research sponsor may not be able to guarantee the proper
functioning of all of the channels of drug distribution in a
developing country, but it can guarantee the payment of a
royalty on sales. In short, one can have a strong safeguard to
prevent exploitation without requiring that a studied inter-
vention be made available in the host country after the study.
It is not only feasible to allow different kinds of benefit,
it may be desirable to do so. Denying the option of different
kinds of benefit might wrongly tie the developing country's
values to the values of the developed country. A wealthier
country will likely place a higher value on treatments for
disease than a poorer country that lacks clean water and
other public health necessities. The developing country would
do better to receive royalties or other payments that it could
allocate to measures for preventing disease than to receive a
drug for treating a disease that could have been prevented.
Furthermore, by providing fixed payments rather than roy-
alty payments, the study sponsors can ensure that a benefit is
gained by the study subjects. If a developing country's benefit
is to be realized solely through royalties, the country will
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receive nothing if the experimental therapy does not make it
to market.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we can accept the important principle that universal
standards of ethics for human research (e.g., no exploitation)
exist and also recognize that those principles apply differ-
ently when local circumstances vary. Studies that might be
unethical in the U.S. may nevertheless be ethical in other
countries, just as studies that are unethical in other countries
may be ethical in the United States (e.g., a study in Kenya
with compensation of $500).
When studies in developing countries take into account
local circumstances, it is essential to employ strong safe-
guards that prevent exploitation. However, appropriately
strong safeguards can be employed without requiring that a
studied intervention be made available in the host country
after the study is completed. Other kinds of benefit (e.g.,
royalties) can be provided to protect the host country from
exploitation.
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